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Automotive, rail and aerospace supply chains in the West Midlands 
are in a fragile position, given their exposure to logistics dependency 
on the Channel Tunnel and ports in the south-east of the UK. 
That’s a key finding in our new report, Brexit and UK Auto, Rail and 
Aerospace: Understanding Logistics and Supply Chain. The report 
also suggests that tens of thousands of automotive, rail and 
aerospace jobs are at risk in the UK in the event of a no trade deal 
Brexit at the end of 2020. 
Based on a survey over 200 firms in the region in late 2019 and early 
2020, the research finds that transport manufacturers and suppliers in 
the West Midlands are particularly exposed to the operations of 
Jaguar Land Rover (JLR), given its dominance in the region. 
They also have significant exposure to other manufacturers, including 
Honda – which has already announced its intention to close its 
Swindon plant by 2022. 
A further important finding of the report is that supply chain firms in 
the region are highly dependent on EU workers: they account for on 
average 31% of the workforce of the firms surveyed – much higher 
than the average figure for UK manufacturing of around 10%. 
This could pose recruitment challenges for such firms going forward, 
and raises issues about further devolving skills and training to the 
regional level to deal with such sector specific impacts locally. 
More broadly, the supply chain firms surveyed face major challenges, 
often brought about by their import/export ratios. 
This spills over into a reliance on certain transport routes: the firms 
surveyed are heavily dependent on the Channel Tunnel, with 17% of 
exporters and 14% of importers exclusively using it. 
Firms also intensively use the ports of Liverpool, Southampton, 
Immingham and Felixstowe, placing additional pressure on regional 
transport networks in the event of a ‘hard Brexit’ that involves customs 
checks. 
In this context, the reliance on the Channel Tunnel is a major risk 
factor for supply chain firms in the West Midlands. With a bare bones 
trade deal, even short customs delays could hold up such traffic. 
And if even a small proportion of traffic from the Channel Tunnel gets 
rerouted, it will cause an increase in port traffic elsewhere, placing 
additional strains on an underfunded regional rail and road network. 
Our survey found a mixed picture when it came to ‘Brexit readiness’ in 
these supply chain firms. 
Many firms (89%) had stockpiled materials and had proactively 
informed employees about the settled status scheme. Of greater 
concern was the fact that only 24% had completed detailed and 
accurate activities around commodity code and product classification. 
Similarly, only 16% of respondents felt that their organisation was 
completely prepared with the necessary skills to complete new 
customs paperwork related to trade with the EU. A large majority felt 
that they were at medium risk (70%), with the remainder of firms 
highly exposed on this front. 
Transport manufacturing industries continue to be of vital importance 
to the UK economy. In 2018, UK auto alone directly contributed £16.9 
billion to the economy, and represented over 9% of total UK 
manufacturing. 
The pre-eminence of the West Midlands in automotive in particular is 
apparent from the maps below. The region accounts for about one-
third of the UK total in employment terms. 
However, in terms of value added the significance of the region is 
even higher, given the presence of a national strategic asset in the 
form of JLR, which undertakes substantial R&D and value-adding 
work in the local area. 
This stands in contrast to some other vehicle manufacturers based in 
the UK, which largely only undertake final assembly. 
 
 
The West Midlands employs over 50,000 people in automotive alone 
and another 20,000 in related sectors. 
Our analysis suggests that tens of thousands of jobs in the sector 
would be exposed in the event of a hard Brexit. 
The costs of a hard Brexit (particularly a default no trade deal 
scenario at the end of 2020) would be considerable for JLR in 
particular – of the order of at least £1.2 billion a year for the firm 
according to its own estimates. This would be unsustainable with 
current UK operations. 
A key message is that the impacts of a hard Brexit on the auto sector 
would likely have significant, and very localised, effects in the region. 
More broadly, UK auto before 2016 was on track to produce 2m cars 
by 2020. Yet last year it made just 1.3m with a risk that this could fall 
below 1m. 
That original target now seems like a distant dream, with the 
government already reportedly talking about automobiles being a 
‘declining industry’. 
The industry faces big challenges on a number of fronts, and there is 
a real need to reiterate the importance of the sector going forward. 
Not only is the form of Brexit critical for its future, but so too is a 
renewed effort in terms of industrial policy to seize the opportunities 
from the transition to electric vehicles. 
This needs to include attracting a major battery plant to the UK, where 
the UK currently lags investment in Europe. 
For policy makers a key message is that a trade agreement with the 
EU needs to ensure minimal disruption to the supply chain operations 
of manufacturers. 
As the Australian experience demonstrates (as illustrated in our 
book Carmageddon? Brexit and Beyond for UK Auto), once these 
jobs are lost the skill sets disappear, which in turn will undermine 
efforts to make the UK a lead on green technologies such as the shift 
to electric mobility. 
 
